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Immunity of International Organizations
in United States Courts: Absolute or
Restrictive?
Richard J. Oparil*
ABSTRACT

Since 1945, international and intergovernmental organizations have
been entitled to immunity under the InternationalOrganizationsImmunities Act (01A) akin to that enjoyed by foreign governments, which was

absolute at that time. In 1976, however, passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) significantly restricted the nature offoreign
governments' immunity. This Article addresses the issue of whether the
FSIA also restricted the immunity enjoyed by international organizations. The first two sections describe the IOLA and the FSIA. The third
section discusses a number of cases involving internationalorganizations
and the ways courts have been able to avoid the issue of whether the
immunity enjoyed by international organizationshas changed. The final
section asserts that an international organization sued in a United
States court can make a good argument based primarily on the legislative
history of the two statutes that it is still entitled to absolute immunity.
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INTRODUCTION

The number and functions of international and intergovernmental organizations are legion. They also "exercise a political, economic and social influence of massive importance."' Organizations such as the United
Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the
Organization of American States (OAS) are well-known and the subject
of frequent news stories. Other organizations, such as the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), receive less publicity. All, however, are international and intergovernmental organizations that receive
some level of immunity in United States courts.
Since the 1940s, these organizations have been entitled to immunity
under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA).2 The
IOIA originally provided organizations with the immunity enjoyed by
foreign governments, which at the time was absolute-even in suits arising out of a commercial activity. The nature of the immunity for foreign
governments changed radically in 1976, when Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).' The FSIA essentially provides
governments only with restrictive immunity.4
This Article addresses whether the nature and extent of the immunity
enjoyed by international organizations changed as a result of the enactment of FSIA. No provision in the FSIA expressly states that the statute
changed the nature of the immunity enjoyed by international organizations. To date, many courts have noted the issue of whether the FSIA
amended the IOIA, but none have addressed it.
Sections II and III describe the two primary statutes at work. Section
IV discusses a number of cases involving international organizations and
the ways courts have been able to skirt the issue of whether absolute or
restrictive immunity applies to the organizations. Section V asserts that
an international organization sued in United States courts has a good
argument that absolute immunity still applies, notwithstanding the
FSIA.

1. Thomas J. O'Toole, Sovereign Immunity Redivivus: Suits Against International
Organizations, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 1 (1980).

2. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1988).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (1988).
4.

See id. § 1605. For example, if an embassy in the United States contracts with a

company to provide supplies and the embassy fails to pay its bill, the supplier can bring
suit in United States courts to collect. See id. § 1605(a)(2)-(3).
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II.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IMMUNITIES ACT

Under international and national law, international organizations possess certain judicial immunities.5 United States law provides immunity to
these organizations,' absent waiver.7 The IOIA provides in relevant part:
International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located, and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit
and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments,
except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any
contract. 8

5. The United States is not the only government that provides international organizations with immunity. See, e.g., the United Kingdom's International Organisations Act,
1968, ch. 48.
6. Section 1 of the IOIA defines an "international organization" as:
a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such
participation or making an appropriation for such participation, and which shall
have been designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in this
subchapter.
22 U.S.C. § 288. The international organizations recognized by the President pursuant
to the IOIA may be found in an addendum to 22 U.S.C. § 288.
7. Section 1 of the IOIA provides also that:
The President shall be authorized, in the light of the functions performed by any
such international organization, by appropriate Executive order to withhold or
withdraw from any such organization or its officers or employees any of the privi-

leges, exemptions, and immunities provided for in this subchapter.., or to condition or limit the enjoyment by any such organization or its officers or employees of
any such privilege, exemption, or immunity. The President shall be authorized, if
in his judgment such action should be justified by reason of the abuse by an international organization or its officers and employees of the privileges, exemptions,
and immunities provided in this subchapter or for any other reason, at any time to
revoke the designation of any international organization under this section, whereupon the international organization in question shall cease to be classed as an
international organization for the purposes of this subchapter.

Id.
8. Id. § 288a(b).
Section 2(c) of the IOIA, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(c), also may have relevance to legal proceedings in the United States. That section provides: "Property and assets of international organizations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from
search, unless such immunity be expressly waived, and from confiscation. The archives of
international organizations shall be inviolable." Thus, international organizations should
be able to effectively resist subpoenas in civil or criminal proceedings for the production
of documents in the archives of the organization. See Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d
843 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (United Nations files and information derived therefrom is privi-
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When Congress enacted the IOIA in 1945, foreign governments were
absolutely immune from suit in the United States.' The House Ways
and Means Committee report on the legislation stated that in situations
when "the United States Government associates itself with one or more
foreign governments in an international organization, there exists at the
present time no law of the United States whereby this country can extend privileges of a governmental character with respect to international
organizations or their officials in this country."' The report stated that

leged from disclosure).
The United States State Department also has issued an opinion on the inviolability of
premises. In a memorandum provided to the Organization of American States (OAS), the
Department wrote:
The concept of inviolability of premises has applicability to property of a recognized international organization in the United States.... Under [the IOIA], the

property and assets of an international organization wherever located, is immune
from search and confiscation, unless such immunity is expressly waived. This
principle, as expressed in the domestic statute, reflects the customary rule of international law that property and premises of foreign governments and international
organizations used for official purposes are entitled to inviolability and may not be
entered by authorities of the receiving state without first seeking permission of the
Ambassador or equivalent representative. Consequently it would be improper for
officers of the Metropolitan Police Department or other persons not previously
authorized by the Organization of American States to attempt to enter the premises of the OAS for the purpose of conducting a search.

Memorandum from Horace F. Shamwell, Jr. to William Mailliard (July 10, 1974) (unpublished and on file with author). The arrest of an OAS employee in OAS' Washington
headquarters for charges relating to the alleged possession of a firearm prompted the

memorandum. The State Department refused to opine whether the violation of the principle of inviolability would have any effect on the criminal case itself.
9. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). This court stated that "[ais of 1945, the statute granted absolute immunity to

international organizations, for that was the immunity then enjoyed by foreign
governments."
10. H.R. REP. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S.C.C.
Serv. 946-47.
In the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2349,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

160 (1945), reprinted in Privileges and Immunities, 13 WHITEMAN DIGEST § 4, at 36.
the Secretary of State reported:
So far as the United States is concerned, legislation will be needed to enable the
officials of the United States to afford all of the appropriate privileges and immunities due the Organization and its officials.... Such legislation would deal with
such exemption from various tax burdens and other requirements as is commonly
granted to representatives of foreign governments. The enactment of legislation
and its application to such persons would not be for the purpose of conferring a
favor upon any individuals. It would rather be for the purpose of assuring to the
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section 288a set forth "certain general exemptions which would be ex'
tended to international organizations including immunity from suit." 11
Congress, in enacting the IOIA, undoubtedly intended to p;rovide
these organizations with the absolute immunity then enjoyed by foreign
governments. The question then becomes whether Congress intended
that immunity to remain static or to vary with the type of irmmunity

provided to governments.
III.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES

ACT

In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA. The idea of sovereign immunity
as "a doctrine of international law under which domestic courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state,"' 2 originated
from concepts of national sovereignty. These concepts developed from
natural law, the divine right of kings, and the maxim that "the king can
do no wrong."is
The United States recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity
early. In The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,4 Chief Justice Marshall deemed sovereign status a preeminent consideration in determining
immunity. The case involved a vessel owned by a United States citizen
that the French government seized in the mid-Atlantic and outfitted in
France as a public armed ship. A storm forced the ship into a United
States harbor, and the former owner brought an admiralty action. In
granting immunity, the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule
that public property destined for a public use is immune from the jurisdiction of its national courts.1 5 The public purpose of a sovereign's propOrganization the possibility that its work could be carried on without interference

or interruption. The according of such privileges and immunities is merely one

aspect of cooperating with the Organization itself.
The Ways and Means Committee report noted that passage of the IOIA would satisfy
the government's obligations to the United Nations, as well as support establishment of
the United Nations' headquarters in the United States. See 1945 U.S.C.C. Serv. at 947.
11. Id. at 948.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House
Report], reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
1 13. See Clark C. Siewert, Note, Reciprocal Influence of British and United States
Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law From The Schooner Exchange to the State Immunity Act of 1978, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 761, 763 (1980).
14. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
15. See Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). The Court supported its decision by looking to English law. For example, in The Parlement Belge,
[1879-80] 5 P.D. 197 (Eng. C.A.), the King of Belgium owned the vessel involved that
the Belgian Navy staffed, and that carried mail and merchandise. An English tug owner
sought damages resulting from a collision, yet the court granted immunity. The Porto
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erty received expansive interpretation.
The Court, however, began to question the absolute immunity doctrine in the 1940s. In Ex Parte Republic of Peru,6 the Court accepted a
State Department pronouncement that immunity should be granted

without looking to any other factor. 17 In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 8 the State Department did not take a position, but the Supreme
Court denied sovereign immunity. 9 The Court wrote that in subsequent
cases it would examine whether granting or denying immunity would
result in embarrassment to the executive branch when determining
whether to grant immunity.20 Past State Department policy also would
be considered. 21 Naturally, Hoffman created confusion in cases when the
State Department did not communicate a position to the court.
In an attempt to resolve this confusion in 1952, the State Department
issued the "Tate Letter, ' 22 indicating that it would no longer recognize
immunity for private acts of foreign sovereigns. The Department thus
adopted the restrictive theory of immunity in the United States.
The Supreme Court recognized this theory in Alfred Dunhill of
London v. Republic of Cuba,2 3 in which a plurality declared that sovereign immunity no longer would be extended to commercial transactions
engaged in by foreign states.2 That same year, Congress passed the
FSIA.25
The FSIA grants United States district courts original jurisdiction
over in personam civil actions against a foreign state 28 when the state is
Alexander, 1920 P. 30, 31 (Eng. C.A.), established absolute immunity doctrine in which
the court wrote that a "sovereign state could not be impleaded either by being served in
personam or indirectly by proceedings against its property; and if that were the principle
it mattered not how the property was being employed."
16. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
17. Id. at 586-87.
18. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
19. Id, at 38.
20. Id. at 35-36.
21.

Id. at 36.

22.

26

DEP'T ST.

BULL. 984 (1952). The Tate Letter was named for the letter writ-

ten by the Acting Legal Adviser to the Acting Attorney General.
23. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
24. Id. at 706.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
26. Section 1603(a) defines "foreign state" to include "a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)
(1988). The later term is defined by Section 1603(b) as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or

1991]

INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITY IN U.S. COURTS

not entitled to immunity by reason of an exception or an applicable in-

ternational agreement.27 Section 1604 of the FSIA indicates that foreign
states generally are immune from suit, unless an exception can be found
or an international agreement applies.2 8 The legislative history indicates
that once a foreign state produces prima facie evidence of immunity, the
burden of going forward shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that the state is not entitled to immunity.29 The ultimate burden
of proving immunity rests with the foreign state,"0 and the FSIA sets
forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of
foreign sovereign immunity. 1 As Judge Gesell wrote, even under the

political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under
the laws of any third country.
Id. § 1603(b).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1330. For the FSIA exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605-07 (1988).
See generally In re Matter of Sedco, 543 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D. Tex.), vacated, 610 F.
Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
28. This section provides the following:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act[,] a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604.
The most common exceptions to immunity are waiver (§ 1605(a)(1)), commercial activity (§ 1 605(a)(2)-(3)), and certain tortious acts (§ 1605(a)(5)).
Moreover, the statute continues:
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state intervenes, in
a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded
immunity with respect to any counterclaim(a) for which the foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under section

1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate action against the
foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or
differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.
28 U.S.C. § 1607.
29. See In re Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 564.
30. 1976 House Report, supra note 12, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6616.
31. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610.
Foreign states-but not their agencies or instrumentalities-may not be held liable for
punitive damages, even if immunity is denied. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. That section provides:
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to
immunity under section 1605 [commercial activities/torts] or section 1607 [counterclaims] of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and
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FSIA "immunity remains the rule rather than the exception." 2
The FSIA also provides states with immunity from attachment of, or
execution against, certain property they own. 3 At least one of these provisions strongly suggests, however, that Congress did not intend FSIA
immunity to apply to international organizations. 4
IV.

CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS'

IMMUNITY

Courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether the FSIA limits the
immunity granted by the IOIA.35 Boimah v. United Nations General
Assembly precisely outlines the dispute: "It is unclear whether the
[IOIA], by granting to international organizations immunity co-extensive
with that of foreign governments, confers the absolute immunity foreign
governments enjoyed at the time of the Act's passage, or the somewhat
restrictive immunity provided for in the [FSIA] .. ."36
The courts deciding international organization immunity questions
have been able to avoid resolving this question because those cases in
which the issue has arisen have resulted generally in a finding that such
organizations are immune from suits over employee relationships or
other purely internal administrative matters. In other words, courts
have not been forced to decide this question because of the very specific
and limited context in which organization immunity cases have arisen.
The "relationship of an international organization with its internal administrative staff is noncommercial, and, absent waiver, activities defining or arising out of that relationship may not be the basis of an action

to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign
state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive
damages.
Id.
See Gibbons v. Republic of Ir., 532 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1982) (foreign state not
liable for punitive damages).
32. Gibbons, 532 F. Supp. at 671. The court went on to note that it "must respect
the immunity of a foreign sovereign unless some exception to the rule of sovereign immu-

nity is clearly warranted." Id.
33.

28 U.S.C. § 1609-11 (1988).

34. See discussion infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
35. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 618 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Tuck v.

Pan American Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Broadbent v. Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Boimah v. United Nations
General Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
36.

Boimah, 664 F. Supp. at 71.

37. See discussion infra at notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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against the organization. . . ."" Therefore, the immunity enjoyed by
international organizations under either the IOIA or the FSIA insulates
those organizations from jurisdiction in suits by its employees, as well as
in suits concerning internal administrative matters.
In Broadbent v. Organization of American States, 9 seven discharged
GAS staff members filed a breach of contract suit against the organization.4 ° The court refused to decide the "difficult question" of whether an
absolute or restrictive theory governed."' Instead, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that, under either
theory, the OAS was immune from employment-related suits.4 2 The
court stated that international organizations must not be hindered in performance of their functions by individual member states. The interna-

tional civil service is unique in nature and should operate free from national politics. 4 3 Similarly, "[a]n attempt by the courts of one nation to
adjudicate the personnel claims of international civil servants would entangle those courts in the internal administration of those organiza'
tions." 44
Judge Leventhal expressed concern that denial of immunity
would open the door to divided decisions of different courts, which would
undercut uniformity in the application of staff rules and negotiations and
impair the organization's ability to function effectively.4 5
Broadbent set the tone for other courts to follow in employment or
administration-related cases. For example, Mendaro v. World Bank involved sexual harassment and discrimination claims brought by a former
World Bank employee.46 The district court dismissed the suit. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed,47 finding that
World Bank's immunity applied and that the Bank's Articles of Agree-

38. Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 35; see also Mendaro, 717 F.2d 610; Tuck, 668 F.2d
547; Donald v. Orfila, 618 F. Supp. 645 (D.D.C.), affd per curiam, 788 F.2d 36 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Morgan v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492
(D.D.C. 1990); Boimah, 664 F. Supp. 69; Chiriboga v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction
and Dev., 616 F. Supp. 963 (D.D.C. 1985); Novak v. World Bank, No. 81-1329
(D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1983); Kissi v. De Larosiere, No. 82-1267 (D.D.C. June 23, 1982);
Jacob v. Curt, No. 88-591-PA (D. Or. June 8, 1989); Weidner v. Int'l Telecommunications Satellite Org., 392 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1978).
39. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 28.
41.

Id. at 32.

42. Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 34-35.

45. Id. (footnote omitted).
46. 717 F.2d 610, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 613.
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ment4 8 did not constitute a waiver of immunity for internal disputes.
The court acknowledged that the Bank's Articles of Agreement did not
waive immunity from actions arising from external activities. The court,
however, held that article III, section 1 did not dictate a waiver of immunity to actions arising from internal operations. 49 Instead, the court held
that the Articles provided the World Bank with functional immunity-immunity that would enable the organization to carry out its mission properly.50 A waiver of immunity involving "internal administrative
grievances is not necessary for the Bank to perform its functions, . . .
could severely hamper its worldwide operations"'" and "would lay the
Bank open to disruptive interference with its employment policies." 52

48. Article VII, section 3 provides:
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction
in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an
agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or
guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members. The property and assets of the
Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from all
forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of final judgment
against the Bank.
Articles of Agreement of the Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Dec. 27, 1945, art.
7, sec. 3, 60 Stat. 1440, 1457-58, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 180.
Compare article VII, section 3 with IMF article IX, section 3, infra note 59 and
accompanying text.
49. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618.
50. Id. See United States ex rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425

(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
51. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615.
52. Id. Also, courts have found that United States labor laws do not apply to international organizations. For example, the court in Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424
F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969), ruled that the World Bank was outside the ambit of the
National Labor Relations Act and was not subject to National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) orders. In National Detective Agencies, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 1978
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,530, 32,474 (Aug. 14, 1978), the NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction over a third-party employer with respect to security guards assigned to the InterAmerican Development Bank and the IMF. Id. at 32,478. The NLRB found that immunity existed even though a third party actually employed the security guards. The
NLRB found this primarily because the immune international organizations exercised
almost complete control over the working conditions of the security guards. Id. at 32,477
In a letter ruling, the NLRB subsequently declared the World Bank not to be subject to
its jurisdiction, stating:
The charge alleges that a security official employed by the... World Bank, unlawfully threatened an employee with termination for having engaged in union
activity. The Board has held that, as an international organization, The World
Bank enjoys the privileges and immunities from the laws of the sovereignty in
which it is located customarily extended to such organizations, absent a clear ex-
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Following and quoting Mendaro, the court upheld the World Bank's
immunity from employment-related suits in Novak v. World Bank,53
dismissing an action involving allegations of age discrimination and conspiracy on the ground that it "does not touch on the Bank's external,
'5 4
commercial activities but rather on its internal personnel practices.
In Chiribogav. internationalBank for Reconstruction and Development,55 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
extended the scope of Mendaro by holding that the Bank was immune
from suits brought by employees and third party beneficiaries over matters relating to the administration of employee benefits.5" Judge Joyce
Green wrote that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a suit that touches more
5'1
closely on the internal operations of an international organization.
Kissi v. De Larosiere8 involved an employment discrimination case
brought against the Managing Director of the IMF. In that case, the
district court held the IMF and its Managing Director to be immune for
actions performed in his legal capacity. The court relied on the IMF's
Articles of Agreement, which provided the organization with immunity
from every form of judicial process, unless waived.59 The court deemed
rejection of an employment application, even if discriminatory, to be official action to which immunity attached.
In Tuck v. Pan American Health Organization (PAHO),60 the court
found PAHO immune from suit by an outsider, a nonemployee who had
contracted to provide legal services to the PAHO Staff Association. 6
The plaintiff claimed that PAHO had breached and tortiously interfered
with his contract, that it had discriminated against him on the basis of

race, and that it had interfered with his attorney-client relationship with
PAHO employees. 62 The court confirmed PAHO's immunity, holding
that the suit "arose from PAHO's supervision of its civil service personpression of Congress that particular legislation was intended to apply to such an
organization.
Letter from Albert W. Palewicz, NLRB Acting Regional Director, to Local 525, Service
Employees Int'l Union (Dec. 20, 1988) (unpublished and on file with author).
53. No. 81-1329 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1983).
54. Id., slip op. at 2.
55. 616 F. Supp. 963 (D.D.C. 1985).
56. Id. at 967.

57.
58.
59.
3, 60
60.
61.
62.

Id.
No. 82-1267 (D.D.C. June 23, 1982).
See Articles of Agreement of the Int'l Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. ix, sec.
Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 74.
668 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 550.
Id. at 548-49.
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nel and from its provision and allocation of office space." 63
In Boimah v. United Nations General Assembly,6 4 the court found
that the United Nations was immune from an employment discrimination suit brought by a temporary worker at the United Nations.65 "Recent case law is clear that an international organization's self-regulation
of its employment practices is an activity essential to the 'fulfillment of
its purposes,' and thus an area to which immunity must extend." 66
In the recent case of Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v.
Communications Satellite Corp.,67 the court held that COMSAT, a private corporation created by Congress and designated as the United States
representative to INTELSAT, an international organization designed to
facilitate world-wide communications systems, is immune from a lawsuit
brought under the antitrust laws.6 8 INTELSAT's member nations are
all signatories to a definitive agreement, which provides that any member
nation wishing to establish or use a non-INTELSAT international satel-

63. Id. at 550.
64. 664 F. Supp. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
65. Id. at 72. Article 105(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that: "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1).
One court interpreted this provision to provide the United Nations with functional immunity. United States ex rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). The history of this article states:
The draft article proposed by the Committee does not specify the privileges and
immunities respect for which it imposes on the member states. This has been
thought superfluous. The terms privileges and immunities indicate in a general
way all that could be considered necessary to the realization of the purposes of the
Organization, to the free functioning of its organs and to the independent exercise
of the functions and duties of their officials: exemption from tax, immunity from
jurisdiction, facilities for communication, inviolability of buildings, properties, and
archives, etc. . . .But if there is one certain principle it is that no member state
may hinder in any way the working of the Organization or take any measures the
effect of which might be to increase its burdens, financial or other.
XIII DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 703, 704-05 (1945), reprinted in Privileges and Immunities, 13 WHITEMAN DIGEST § 4, at 35-36.
The United Nations immunities are also grounded in the Convention on Privileges
and Immunities. Article II, section 2 of the Convention provides that the United Nations
"shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity." Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, art. 2, sec. 2, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1422, 1
U.N.T.S. 15, 16-18.
66. Boimah, 664 F. Supp. at 71.
67. 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 169,188 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
68. Id. at 64,584.
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lite system must first receive approval from an INTELSAT group. 9
Plaintiff owned such a non-INTELSAT satellite. It filed an action
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, seeking injunctive relief and damages. It alleged that COMSAT refused to negotiate with INTELSAT
on its behalf and that COMSAT had engaged in anticompetitive conduct
to hinder its entry into the domestic and international telecommunications markets.7
COMSAT argued that it was immune under the IOIA and INTELSAT agreements. The court, however, relied on language in the statute
establishing COMSAT and on the complaint's allegations concerning
COMSAT as the United States representative to INTELSAT, but not
COMSAT as an owner of a communications common carrier. 1
Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2 decided in September 1990, illustrates the breadth of the current
rule on sovereign immunity. Morgan filed an action against the World
Bank for false imprisonment, libel, slander per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 3 Morgan's complaint alleged that he was a
temporary secretary assigned to the World Bank by an employment
agency. He asserted that on November 14, 1989, after arriving at work,
his World Bank identification pass was confiscated, and he was taken
into custody by World Bank security personnel or agents, who accused
him of theft.74 World Bank agents purportedly told Morgan that he was
terminated, but they later allowed him to return to his position at the
Bank. He claimed continued harassment by the Bank's security
personnel.7 5
The World Bank asserted immunity from Morgan's suit as an inter-

national organization and moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion on the basis that "[diecisions in this Circuit have uniformly
upheld immunity in cases involving relations between an international
organization and its employees." 6 Following Mendaro, the court ruled
that "employee relations of any kind cannot be the subject of litigation
against the Bank," 7 and that the Bank's Articles of Agreement "constitute a waiver of immunity only from those suits 'arising out of its exter-

69. Id. at 64, 582-83.
70. Id. at 64, 580.
71. Id. at 64, 582-83.
72. 752 F. Supp. 492 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 493.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 495.
76. Id. at 493.
77. Id. at 494.
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The court then went on to

find that Morgan's claims arose directly from the World Bank's employment practices, for which the World Bank did not waive its immunity.79
According to the court, nothing about the claim in that case related to
the World Bank's external lending or commercial activities.8 0 Based on
the facts pleaded by Morgan, Judge Gesell had no trouble finding that
the case was limited to the grievances of an individual staff member concerning an employment relationship."' If this suit were allowed to proceed, it "would force the Bank to defend internal employment practices
traditionally shielded by immunity. 8' 2 Consequently, the district court
found an absence of any waiver of immunity in the situation prevented
Morgan from litigating his claim.

78. Id.at 493 (quoting Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618).
79. Id. at 494.
80. Id. The only case that declined to recognize an asserted claim of immunity by an
international organization is Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev.
Bank, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Lutcher was a Brazilian company that received a
World Bank loan. Id. at 455. It brought an action when the Bank made a loan to
Lutcher's competitor, allegedly in violation of its loan agreement. Id. The court denied
immunity in that case, which, as the court recognized in Mendaro, "arose out of the
Bank's external lending activities." 717 F.2d at 620. The Lutcher court wrote:
Just as it is necessary for the Bank to be subject to suits by bondholders in order to
raise its lending capital, it may be that responsible borrowers committing large
sums and plans on the strength of the Bank's agreement to lend would be reluctant
to enter into borrowing contracts if thereafter they were at the mercy of the Bank's
good will, devoid of means of enforcement.
382 F.2d at 459-60 (footnote omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-

EIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 467, Reporters' Note 3 (1987) ("The

charters of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international financial institutions contain provisions permitting suits against the organization
under some circumstances and in selected venues; these provisions were designed to permit suits by bondholders and related creditors.").
81. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494. Judge Gesell further said:
Morgan attacks the Bank's handling of its internal investigation into cash allegedly
stolen from one of the offices at its headquarters. Bank guards and officials allegedly detained Morgan, questioned him about personal details, denied access to
counsel, failed to show cause, questioned his colleagues about him, placed him
under surveillance in-house, caused a coworker to believe that Morgan had been
fired for stealing money and gave conflicting signals as to whether he would receive a letter of exoneration. This alleged course of conduct arose directly from
Morgan's work at his job. Accordingly, the fact that Morgan is not in all respects
formally an employee of the Bank but serves on detail from his agency is of no
legal consequence.... That the conduct of Bank officials may have been improper
is irrelevant.
Id.
82. Id.
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The district court also found that the commercial activity and tort exceptions of the FSIA s8 did not justify piercing the Bank's immunity. The
court reached these conclusions after "assuming arguendo that the restrictive immunity standard of [the FSIA], rather than the absolute im84
munity of international organizations, applies to the World Bank."1
Thus, according to Judge Gesell, even if the FSIA's restrictive theory of
immunity governed, as Morgan claimed, the World Bank would still be
immune, and Morgan's complaint would be dismissed.8 5
The district court first ruled that the "commercial activity" exception
of the FSIA88 did not apply and thus did not remove the World Bank's
immunity. Morgan argued that because he was a temporary employee
assigned to World Bank under contract with an employment agency, the
action should be considered commercial in nature. The court rejected this
argument. Because Morgan's claims arose from the World Bank's employment practices, rather than from the arrangement between World
Bank and Morgan's temporary employment agency, it involved no "com87
mercial activity."
Second, the court held that even assuming that the FSIA applied,
Morgan's suit could not be maintained under the tort exception of the
FSIA.88 "By its own terms, the tort exception does not pierce immunity

83. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
84. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494.
85. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). That provision denies immunity in any case:
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.
Id. "Commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction
or act, rather than by reference to its purposes." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
87. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494.
88. Id. The tort exception of the FSIA denies immunity in any case:
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss, of property, occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse or process, libel, slander,
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for two of the complaint's four counts, those alleging libel and slander." 9 Consequently, the court deemed Morgan's libel and slander
counts precluded by the express language of the FSIA.
The court found the remaining two claims, false imprisonment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, to be foreclosed by the discretionary function exemption of the FSIA. 90 The district court relied on
MacArthur Area Citizens Association v. Republic of Peru.1 In MacArthur, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the Peruvian Government's decision to purchase a building and
modify it to incorporate "specific security measurements" was immune
from a suit by neighbors alleging zoning violations by FSIA immunity as
a "decision[] made in the execution or implementation of a discretionary
policy or activity, namely, establishing a chancery for the Naval Attache
in the District of Columbia."92 Applying MacArthur, Judge Gesell
noted that the complaint alleged a continuous investigation process, involving the participation of high-level World Bank Security and Ethics
Department officials, designed to locate missing money.9 3 "The alleged
false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress clearly
involved the exercise of policy judgment. According to the complaint
Morgan was singled out, detained, and extensively questioned, and there
was strong indication that Morgan's supervisor knew in advance that

security personnel would be questioning Morgan."9 World Bank executives also clearly monitored and guided Morgan's treatment after the
first incident.9 5 Therefore, no waiver or FSIA exception applied to the
immunity enjoyed by the World Bank for these actions.9
Because of holdings that organizations are immune from suits concerning employee relationships or other purely internal administrative
matters, irrespective of which immunity theory applies, the issue remains
open.

misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
89. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494-95 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B)).
90. Id. at 495; see 28 U.S.C. § 1650(a)(5)(A).
91. 809 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
92. Id. at 922-23.
93. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 495.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Employees of at least some international organizations have a forum for employment-related disputes. For example, the World Bank has an administrative tribunal that
hears and decides grievances. See Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 616; see also Broadbent, 628
F.2d at 28 (OAS Administrative Tribunal).
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WHICH THEORY OF IMMUNITY APPLIES?

At some point, a case will arise that joins the issues presented in this
Article. For example, an employee of an international organization may

negligently injure a third party during the course of this employee's duties on a public street. In a resulting suit against the international organ-

ization, the plaintiff will assert that the restrictive theory applies and the
international organization is not immune under the FSIA tort excep-

tion.9 7 If the organization asserts its immunity and moves to dismiss, the
court cannot avoid ruling on the absolute versus restrictive issue.
A well-supported argument can be made to the effect that recognized
international organizations should receive absolute immunity. Indeed,
the District of Columbia Circuit expressly wrote in a footnote "arguments exist for an immunity under the [IOIA] exceeding that offered
under the FSIA."' 8
The two relevant statutes standing alone do not support this argument. 9 The FSIA does not contain a provision that clearly applies the
statute to international organizations. Therefore, the history of the two
acts may be relevant.1" 0
A review of the legislative history of the IOIA indicates that it refers
to "foreign governments."'

'

The IOIA legislative history does not re-

veal, however, that Congress intended the immunity to vary with that
granted to those governments. The House Report said something very
different: "In general,... the privileges and immunities provided in this

legislation are similar to those granted by the United States to foreign
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
98. Millen Indus. v. Coordination Concil for American Affairs, 855 F.2d 879, 88384 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988). By finding immunity under the FSIA, the court did not reach
the IOIA question..
Commentators are split on the question. Compare Note, JurisdictionalImmunities of
Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE L.J. 1167, 1179 (1982) ("as a matter of
law, the passage of the FSIA has had no effect on the IOIA," but arguing that international organizations should be entitled to only restrictive immunity) with O'Toole, supra
note 1, at 11-12 ("The overriding Congressional intent which springs from a reading of
the immunity provisions of the [IOIA] is that international organizations and foreign

sovereigns shall be treated the same. This purpose cannot be achieved without adjusting
the scope of the IOIA immunity to match the provisions of the FSIA.").
99. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation
does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.")
100. See, e.g., K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining
the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language,
as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.").
101. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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governments and their officials. However, this legislation has the advantage of setting forth in one place all of the specific privileges which international organizations will enjoy." ' 2 The implication of the report is
plain: Congress intended for IOIA immunities to remain static and not
to change as the immunities provided to foreign governments changed.
The plain language and legislative history of the FSIA indicate that
Congress did not mean to change the immunity status of IOIA organizations. By its own terms, the FSIA only applies to "foreign states" or to
an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," which Congress specifically defined in the Act. a°3 International organizations do not fall within
either of these definitions.' 0 4 Therefore, nothing in the legislative history
reveals that Congress intended the FSIA to amend implicitly- the IOIA.
Rather, the House Report stated that the FSIA "is intended to pre-empt
any other State or Federal law (excluding applicable international agreements) for according immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political subdivisions, their agencies, and their instrumentalities."' 0 5 Because Congress fails to mention international organizations, one can only presume
this silence meant Congress did not intend to disturb the IOIA.
The legislative history of the only FSIA section that mentions international organizations directly supports this interpretation of the IOIA and
the FSIA. Section 1611(a) of the FSIA provides:
the property of those organizations designated by the President as being
entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided by
the [IOIA] shall not be subject to attachment or any other judicial process
impeding the disbursement of funds to, or on the order of, a foreign state
as the result of an action brought in the courts of the United States or of
the States.' 05
The House Report clearly indicates that Congress designed section
1611(a) "to permit international organizations designated by the President pursuant to [IOIA] to carry out their functions from their offices
located in the United States without hindrance by private claimants seek-

102. H.R. REP. No. 4489, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S.C.C.
Serv. 946, 950 [hereinafter 1945 House Report].

103. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
104. The House Report's examples'of what would be an agent or instrumentality
(state trading corporation, mining enterprise, transport organization, central bank, government procurement agency) do not include any international organization. 1976 House
Report, supra note 12, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
105. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a).
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ing to attach the payment of funds to a foreign state....,,o The Report
said that this provision specifically included the World Bank and the
IMF. 10 8 It concluded by stating that "[tihe reference to 'international
organizations' in this subsection is not intended to restrict any immunity
accorded to such international organizations under any other law or international agreement." 109 The emphasized language could not be
clearer, and the Senate Report reiterates it.1 10 The IOIA is obviously an
"other law." The language of the Report provides powerful evidence
that Congress did not intend to disturb the immunity of international
organizations by enacting the FSIA.
In addition, the introduction of legislation in the last session of Congress that would have expressly provided those international organizations entitled only to FSIA immunity implies that those organizations
are currently entitled to broader. immunity from suit. Senator Roth of
Delaware introduced a bill that amended the IOIA to include a provision stating that "For purposes of [section 288a(b)], the phrase 'same
immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by
foreign governments' means the same immunity to which foreign states
are entitled under [the FSIA]."' The bill also would have amended the
FSIA to make clear that it applies to recognized international
11 2
organizations.
In introducing the legislation, Senator Roth explained its purpose:
Pursuant to the International Organizations Act of 1945, international
organizations were granted the same immunity from suit and judicial process enjoyed by foreign governments. At that time, foreign governments
generally enjoyed absolute immunity from suit and judicial process.
During the years since 1945, the degree of foreign governments' immunity has changed from absolute to restrictive. As I understand it, the primary feature of restrictive immunity is that a foreign government would
still be immune from judicial process for its governmental and sovereign
acts, but not for its commercial acts. Even though the immunity enjoyed
by foreign governments has changed, the 1945 law has not been changed

107. 1976 House Report, supra note 12, at 30-31, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6629-30.
108. Id. reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6629-30.
109. Id. reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6630.
110. S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1976). The Committee reports
should be particularly important here because Congress passed FSIA without debate
during its rush to adjourn. 122 CONG. REc. H33,536 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).
111. S. Res. 2715, cl. (B), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 7601 (1990) (not
enacted).
112. Id. The bill was given prospective application. Id. at cl. (C).

708

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 24.689

and the listed international organizations retain absolute immunity.
I have been contacted by officials from a domestic corporation which
held contracts from an international organization. In seeking redress for a
perceived commercial wrong, this constituent corporation was informed
that the organization enjoyed absolute immunity from every form of judicial process. I believe that restrictive immunity as defined above is in the
best interest of domestic corporations who deal with international organizations. For this reason I am introducing a bill to amend the International
Organizations Immunities Act and Title 28, United States Code, to restrict the jurisdictional immunity to which certain international organiza113
tions are entitled.
The Senate Judiciary Committee did not report the bill in 1990, and it
has not been re-introduced this session.
Little judicial authority exists for an argument that international organizations still should recieve absolute immunity. One analogous case, Jacob v. Curt,1 14 may be helpful. That case involved a wrongful death
action against two PAHO employees and others alleged an improper
deprivation of the right to receive medical treatment. The complaint alleged that the Bahamas's government shut down a cancer clinic based, in
part, on false reports by the PAHO employees. PAHO itself was not a
defendant. The court dismissed the complaint on the basis of section
228d(b)." 5 The court deemed the employees to possess absolute immunity for acts taken in the course of their official duties.

Jacob provides only marginal support for the proposition that PAHO
also is absolutely immune. The court granted IOIA immunity in Jacob
on the basis of a different section, section 228a, which ties the immunity
possessed by international organizations to that possessed by foreign governments. No comparable provision exists in section 288d(b), and the
FSIA does not apply to individuals. In addition, policy reasons may exist
for giving broader immunity to the employee instead of the organization,
such as a breakdown of the loss shifting and spreading. The converse
policy argument, however, could also be made.
In Donald v. Orfila," e the district court noted that an international
organization should receive "absolute immunity" under the IOIA."7
The statement, however, was in dicta because the court again applied
113. 136 CONG. REC. S7601-02 (daily ed. June 7, 1990).
114. No. 88-591-PA (D. Or. June 8, 1989).
115. That section protects officers and employees of international organizations by
providing immunity "from suit and legal process relating to acts performed by them in
their official capacity and falling within their functions as ... officers or employees."
116., 618 F. Supp. 645 (D.D.C.), afd per curiam, 788 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
117. Id. at 648.

19911

INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITY IN U.S. COURTS

section 228(b). The opinion failed to address the FSIA at all. Consequently, while the legislative history seems rather clear, little case support exists for the preservation of the absolute theory to protect international organizations.
In addition, the United States has taken the position that international
organizations now receive only the restrictive immunity provided for by
the FSIA. In a June 24, 1980 letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the State Department Legal Adviser wrote that: "The
[FSIA] amended [United States] law by codifying a more restrictive theory of immunity subjecting foreign states to suit in U.S. courts in respect
of their commercial activities ... while continuing their exemption from
"118 Under
U.S. jurisdiction for sovereign or governmental activities.
this view, international organizations now are subject to United States
jurisdiction for their commercial activities, but retain immunity for their
public acts.119
VI.

CONCLUSION

An argument can still be made, however, that the IOIA's absolute
immunity protections remain undisturbed. As indicated in Mendaro, the
joint action of several states creates international organizations,"20 while
private corporations are organized only under the laws of one or more
individual nations. "By definition, activities of international organizations are designed to resolve problems spanning national boundaries,
with a benefit to be reaped collectively by the organizations' member
nations.' 12 ' Thus, United States national law would provide recognized
international organizations with a higher level of immunity in order to
better achieve the benefits conferred.
In Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 2 2 the court wrote: "International organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, of
which the United States is a member, are not alien bodies. The interests
of the United States are served when the United Nations' [sic] interests
are protected."' 23 Indeed, the House Ways and Means Committee Report on the IOIA noted that United States self-interest in this type of

118. Letter from Robert B. Owen, State Department Legal Adviser, to Leroy D.
Clark, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (June 24, 1980),
reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 917-18 (1980).

119. Id.
120. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 619.
121. Id.
122. 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
123. Id. at 834.
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legislation is two-fold because "such legislation will not only protect the
official character of public international organizations located in this
country but it will also tend to strengthen the position of international
organizations of which the United States is a member when they are
located or carry on activities in other countries."' 24 The immunity provided to foreign governments has been described as designed "to promote
the functioning of all governments by protecting a state from the burden
of defending lawsuits abroad which are based on its public acts.' 1 25
The same rationale does not apply, however, to nonpublic acts of the
foreign government. By entering the market place or acting as a private

party, modern international law provides no justification "for allowing
the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the agreements it breaches
or the accidents it creates; the law should not permit the foreign state to
shift these everyday burdens of the marketplace onto the shoulders of
private parties.' 126 In other words, the reason for granting foreign governments immunity differs from the justification for providing international organizations with such protection.
Moreover, as section 1 of the IOIA contemplates,'12 7 an international
organization could have its immunity curtailed by the President if the
organization abuses its privileges or engages in improper activities in the
United States. 2 8 Thus, the immune organizations have a powerful incentive not to abuse their immunity. International organizations always
have the option to waive their immunity, whether absolute or restrictive,
and submit to the jurisdiction of United States courts for particular cases.
Consequently, a finding that international organizations are still entitled
to absolute immunity, even in the face of the iestrictive immunity afforded to foreign governments by the FSIA, would be rational and further the interest of United States policy.

124. 1945 House Report, supra note 102, reprinted in 1945 U.S.C.C. Serv. at 947.
125. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before

the Subcomm, on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, State Department).
126. Id.

127. See 22 U.S.C. § 288.
128. The House Report clearly states that:
The Committee believes that the interests of the United States are adequately protected by the restrictions which have been created. The board powers granted to
the President will permit prompt action in connection with any abuse of the privileges and immunities granted hereunder or presumably for other reasons such as
the conduct of improper activities by international organizations in the United
States.
1945 House Report, supra note 102, reprinted in, 1945 U.S.C.C. Serv. at 948.

